IP reuse is rapidly proliferating recent automated circuit design. It is facing serious challenges like forgery, theft and misappropriation of intellectual property (IP) of the design. Thus, protection of design IP is a matter of prime concern. In this paper, we propose a novel Internet-based scheme to tackle this problem. Input to the proposed scheme is a graph corresponding to a digital system design. Watermarking of the graph and its encryption are achieved using a new linear feedback shift register(LFSR)-based locking scheme. The proposed scheme makes unauthorized disclosure of valuable design almost infeasible, and can easily detect any alteration of the design file during transmission. It ensures authentication of the original designer as well as non-repudiation between the seller and the buyer. Empirical evidences on several benchmark problem sets are encouraging.
INTRODUCTION
In this Section, we introduce VLSI IP protection, briefly describe the existing works in this area, and the contribution of our work.
IP Protection
Recent VLSI circuit design involves more integration on a single chip within a shorter design cycle. Design reuse has been incessantly encouraged by the pressures to reduce time to market, better design productivity, and others. Circuit components, in electronic form, signify intellectual property (IP) of VLSI design [6] . Unfortunately, unlimited and careless design reuse may lead to infringement of IP [6, 1] , and enhance the possibility of certain typical attacks such as:
• interception and recovery of original design
• malicious attempt to randomly modify the design
• denial of validity of a legal purchaser by the seller [15] • claiming false IP ownership
• illegal reselling by a purchaser without paying proper royalty to the designer
• attempt to recover original design [2] by a buyer from its modified version prepared for another buyer.
Since the design of a circuit is extremely expensive, it is essential that it should not be vulnerable to any of these attacks. Several works on the use of encryption and watermark embedding of circuits have been reported so far, as discussed in the next sub-section. Major contributions of our work include: (i) it is Internetbased, (ii) it is quite robust due to the use of a strong encryption algorithm, and an easily verifiable, but hard to tamper watermark embedding in the design, (iii) it is generic as the input is considered to be a representative graph of a digital system, and (iv) it makes use of Linear-Feedback Shift Registers (LFSR) for achieving the objectives of protecting the design. In general, the proposed approach can be used for any type of graph.
Related work
IP protection (IPP ) in V LSI design has been studied in recent past. In hierarchical watermarking, topological information of a design is uniquely mapped into topological signature [5] . Robust FPGA IP protection [10] proceeds through embedding distinct set of multiple watermarks for different recipients in the LUTs of FPGA. Watermarking techniques for IP protection in FPL devices have also been reported in [8] . On the other hand, constraint-based watermarking [1] maps signature of the designer into a set of additional constraints, consequently shrinking the optimal solution space. [3] discusses zero-overhead watermarking on FPGA by applying timing constraint on signal delays. [11] , [17] , [14] emphasize on protection of design tool instead of the design itself. [4] was the first proposed scheme for watermark embedding at the physical design level.
Motivation of the work
IP protection scheme is typically judged by several parameters, such as its strength against any attempt to infringe IP without incurring much overhead, the ease of watermark detection, and so on. None of the existing IP protection techniques can ensure complete IP security in terms of all these parameters. Most of the existing watermarking techniques also fail to handle repudiation attack. The tradeoffs between the solution quality and the strength of the watermark, and the lack of correlation between size of watermark and reduction in solution space motivate us to adopt a new viewpoint for IP protection. Selling of design tool instead of design itself, is more risky as indirect IP protection techniques can not prevent IP infringement. However, any misuse of IP tool, without being noticed and detected, causes huge loss of royalty to IP owner. This warrants watermarking of design tools. As discussed in [7] , an IP tool may be supplied by a vendor in the following two ways:
• selling design tool to customer
• running the design tool at vendor's end with design parameters from the customers and supplying the customer only with required design.
In the former case, if the customer uses the tool to generate new design for a third party, genuine creator suffers from royalty loss. This can be controlled through watermarking. In the latter case, unless the channel of transmission is highly secured, the high quality design may be hacked, and hence the design needs to be encrypted. The Internet has yielded new opportunities for the creation and delivery of content in digital forms. We propose an Internet-based IP protection scheme, where the design tool is split into two modules: first module is executed at the creator's end, generating a watermarked and encrypted intermediate design, which is transmitted electronically. Second module of the tool is executed at the buyer's end generating the final design, only after the legitimate buyer decrypts the intermediate design using the private key. A similar scheme has already been proposed in [7] . A cryptosystem [15] using private or public keys almost eliminates the use of ultra-secure key transmission. This paper also proposes an effective watermarking scheme to protect the IP rights of the authentic designer.
A system such as a digital computer, or VLSI circuit, may be defined as a collection of objects, connected to form a coherent entity with a well-defined function. A natural and effective way of modeling such a system is the use of a graph [9] . In the proposed scheme, the core concept involves encryption obtained by changing the interconnection patterns in the graph with the help of a LFSR [13] . The seller uses two LFSRs: one for watermarking, known to seller only, and the other for encryption-cum-decryption, known to both the seller and the buyer (through some prior agreement between the two parties). During watermark generation, a mask bit string is also generated. This mask string is provided to the buyer only on demand for watermark verification. The file which is transmitted from the seller to the buyer contains two components, viz., the encrypted graph, and the watermark. If the encrypted graph is tampered, the hash value can be used to detect it. However, an intruder might like to replace the watermark with his own watermark using his own LF SR. Since the watermark is characterized by a polynomial g(x) (obtained from original graph) and a signature S (obtained from both seller and buyer), such replacement is not possible without knowing the g(x) for the original (un-encrypted) graph. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the proposed schemes for creation and verification of the watermark, and Section 3 illustrates the methods of encryption and decryption. Section 4 discusses the empirical observations, and Section 5 concludes the paper.
WATERMARK CREATION AND VERI-FICATION
The proposed scheme works in two phases:
• Embedding watermark in the input graph G considering signatures of both the seller and the buyer.
• Encrypting the watermarked graph G m , say, with the help of a linear feedback shift register (LFSR) by inserting some new edges in and deleting some existing edges from Gm.
An alternative scheme could be to generate the complete design, encrypt the design file, embed watermark in it, and transmit it through a secure channel. However, this scheme may not be feasible due to the huge volume of the design files, and associated risk. The proposed watermarking scheme is based on identity of both the seller and the buyer of the IP. The buyer can verify the signature of the seller to make sure that the product is being purchased from the legal source. The seller can trace the buyer in case of illegal reselling. Moreover, in order to check for any doubt of illegal design usage, hidden signatures of the valid seller and buyer of a design IP may be retained.
Watermark creation
For a particular design graph G, for each pair of source and destination, the watermark uniquely identifies the pair. The seller is free to choose a LF SR privately of length L, say, and any one of the primitive feedback connections. This LF SR and a technique of shift register polynomial division using it ensures uniqueness and robustness of the generated watermark. Figure 1 shows a LF SR with a feedback loop.
A polynomial g(x) is generated from G as described later. This polynomial characterizes the graph G. However, for a given g(x), the construction of a unique G is not possible i.e. it is one-way function. The polynomial g(x) is applied at the input of LF SR that is initialized with zeros. Let q(x) and , and obtains a binary coefficient g cs in the following manner: concatenate the ASCII code of each character in S to generate a binary string S c . Now, g cs is obtained from g cs = g c S c . S may be signature of the seller or the buyer, or combination of the two (for source and destination based watermarking). Next, gcs, q c , and r c are concatenated to generate a unique watermark W (see Lemma 1 ) . A mask M is also generated along with W to be used in the verification phase. Generation of W and M are according to the Equations 1 and 2. W = arb 0 +q c +arb 1 +r c +arb 2 +start bit+g cs +end bit+arb 3 (1) where '+' denotes the concatenation operator of bits, arbi, i = 0 to 3 denotes some arbitrary bit strings of appropriately chosen lengths. The use of these bit strings make it impossible for an intruder to guess g cs , q c , and r c (so as to guess LF SR and G). Each of start bit and end bit is a '1' used to indicate the begin and end of gcs. The proof is omitted for brevity.
Watermark verification
In order to verify the watermark embedded by the seller in a design, the buyer need to use the mask M transmitted in the encrypted file. W M is computed to find the value of the string "start bit + gcs + end bit", from which the value of g cs can be easily obtained. Buyer may now extract the values of g(x), and signature S applying same procedure as the seller, for verification of the authenticity of the design. A formal description of the algorithm for watermark verification is shown in Figure 3 .
We now discuss the technique for generating g(x) from the input graph. 
Generating a Polynomial from a given graph
Let G represents the input graph. Count the number of vertices of G having identical degrees, in decreasing order of their degrees. The degree is used to denote the power and count contributes to the coefficient of the corresponding term. Since the coefficients of the polynomial are binary, apply mod − 2 operation on the counts to obtain the binary coefficients. To ensure that the polynomial is monic, we enforce the coefficient of the highest degree term to be 1.
Version Control
The proposed watermark creation scheme assigns a unique watermark with each input design graph G, and uniquely identifies a source-destination pair for G. A privately chosen LF SR is used to make W robust and unique. Suppose the seller wants to sell different versions of the same G to more than one buyer. As S represents the combined signature of both seller and buyer, S will vary for same seller and different buyer, and this change is embedded in W . But to control the different versions of the same design graph for the buyers, the seller can use different private LF SRs to generate different unique watermark and corresponding mask. The above version control mechanism generates robust watermark and corresponding mask for the following reasons:
• LF SR is hidden and known to the seller only.
• Different versions use different LF SR, reducing chances of duplication.
ENCRYPTION AND DECRYPTION SCHEMES
The proposed encryption method depends on the modification of a watermarked graph Gm with the help of a LF SR. The following Section introduces LF SRs, states some of its properties, and then justifies its use. L−1 − 1 respectively and thus, differs by only one [13] . P roperty 2: For an m-sequence obtained from an L-stage maximum length LF SR, there is one run (maximal sequence) of L consecutive 1s and one run of L -1 consecutive 0s. For L -1 < r < 0, there are 2 L−(r+2) runs of length r for 1s and the same number of runs of 0s [13] .
Introducing LFSR
In the following, we attempt to justify the use of LF SR in the encryption of G m . LF SR is used to implement random number generators. Thus for a specific G, its modification with the use of the random sequence from a LF SR generates a random graph. LF SR can be simulated software or can be implemented in hardware. Multiple LF SRs may be combined for better security. Thus, the use of LF SR increases the robustness of the proposed encryption method.
The following section describes the design of the encryption scheme using an L-stage LF SR. Hereafter, by LF SR, we refer to only maximum length LF SR. We skip the proof for brevity.
The encryption scheme
The maximum-length LF SR outputs a m-sequence of length 2 L −1 which repeats itself. We just pick a binary string having length 2 × √ α × N from the output of the LF SR, where 0 < α < 1 and N = | Vm |, the number of vertices in the watermarked graph G m . Clearly, this sequence is random, as it is part of the maximum length random (or pseudo-random) sequence of length 2 L -1. We skip the proof for brevity.
Next, the Cartesian product Π of the two sets of integers is formed. Any pair in it corresponds to an edge to be used to modify the watermarked graph G m . If any pair in Π corresponds to an edge in G m , that edge is deleted from Gm. Otherwise the edge is inserted in Gm. This forms a modified graph G m .
In the next step of encryption, at the sender's end, a hash value of G m is generated, which is transmitted along with the encrypted graph G m . Lemma 5 shows that applying the encryption algorithm twice on an input graph will yield the original graph only.
Lemma 5. Assuming encryption of a graph Gm to be a function E(G
We skip the proof for brevity.
Since the encryption scheme uses a private key, for verification at the buyer's end, a hash value for the watermarked graph is also transmitted from the seller. Hashing is based on Merkle-Damgard's Meta method [12] . For generating the hash value of G m , G m is first represented as an adjacency matrix containing 0s and 1s. The adjacency matrix is then converted into a binary string by concatenating all its rows (or all its columns), and Merkle-Damgard's Meta method applied on this binary string to generate the hash value of G m .
Recovery of original graph at buyer's end
At the buyer's end, a procedure same as that applied for encryption at the seller's end, is applied on the modified design G m to produce G m . By Lemma 5, G m should be the same as G m . To check if the design has not been tampered during the transmission, the buyer also generates the hash value of G m and compares with the hash value received from the sender. If these two values match, the buyer is sure that G m = G m and the received design has not been tampered during transmission.
Properties of the Encryption and Decryption schemes
The encryption scheme primarily is used to guard the valuable design against an intruder on the net. As discussed earlier, an additional precaution through watermark embedding helps to detect any unauthorized use of the valuable design by any user other than the valid buyer. In our proposed scheme, the watermarking helps to check non-repudiation as well.
The following parameters used by the seller prior to the transmission are considered hidden from any intruder:
• The private key K b of the seller.
• The length L of the LF SR and the feedback equation for the maximum-length LF SR.
• The value of α.
In case the length L of the LF SR is known to the intruder, the following possibilities arise:
• If key K b is not known to the intruder then number of possible seed values for initializing LF SR is O(2 L ).
• If the feedback equation is not known to the intruder, then the number of possible feedback equations for maximum length
In all the above cases, it is extremely difficult for the intruder to guess the maximum-length LF SR used by the seller, and hence to obtain the original valuable design being transmitted over the Internet.
Definition 2. The characteristic polynomial associated with a maximum length LF SR is called primitive polynomial. A characteristic polynomial is primitive if
• it is prime
• it is a factor of X N + 1, where N = 2 L − 1, and X is a variable of the polynomial.
Number of primitive polynomials for a L stage LF SR is given by
), p is taken over all prime factors of n [13] . Thus for an L stage LF SR, the number of maximum length LF SRs is O(2 L ), and for an intruder knowing L, it is very difficult to guess the LF SR used in encryption.
Use of the parameter α
The length of the output sequence of maximum length LF SR is 2
If we consider the complete output sequence, then the time complexity of encryption would be very large. The parameter α (0 < α < 1) helps to reduce this time complexity drastically. Let the number of vertices in input systems graph G be N , and we would be modifying a maximum of α × N 2 vertex pairs (for edge insertion or deletion). In such a case, we choose a random sequence of length 2 × √ α × N from the entire output sequence of the maximum length LF SR. It can be shown that the worst-case time complexity of encryption, considering the parameter α is O(N 2 ). The length of precision of α has to be chosen properly to improve the robustness of the encryption as well. We skip the proof for brevity.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The proposed scheme is implemented using C language on a Sun workstation running Solaris for some M CN C Benchmark circuits [16] . Table 1 shows the CPU times required to create and verify watermarks for LF SR of length 10. Table  2 shows the times of encryption and decryption for different values of α. In our experiment, due to want of space, the graph is implemented using linked list, leading to a difference in encryption and decryption times. The matrix representation of the graph, however, would yield identical encryption and decryption times. Let Em and E respectively denote the number of edges in the modified graph and the original graph. Let δ denote the Degradation factor. Then Degradation factor is given by the following equation:
Also, if ρ(G) denotes the density of the graph G, N and E respectively denote the number of vertices and edges in G, then density is defined using the following equation: Table 1 shows that the creation and verification of the watermark requires nominal time, which is a desirable feature of such a scheme. In Table 2 , we see that density, ρ, of edges decreases from ibm01 to ibm10. As a result, degradation factor δ increases. δ refers to the % change in the number of edges in the input graph due to encryption. As density of the graph decreases, the probability of number of edges inserted in the graph increases, i.e. degradation factor increases. During encryption, α is used to take a part of output m-sequence from LF SR from which two sets are formed taking the position of 0s and 1s. For larger value of α, the length of output sequence is large, there will be more number of 0s and 1s in the part of the output sequence of the LF SR, resulting in more elements in the two sets. Thus cross product of that two sets yields more edges to modify, which in turn increases the encryption and decryption time.
Figures 4 and 5 respectively show the variation of the CPU times with # of vertices in the original input graph for encryption and decryption, and for watermark creation and verification. In the former, the value of α is taken as 0.0001, and in the latter, the length of the LF SR is considered to be 10. It may be noted that watermark creation time depends on the processing of polynomial g(x) by the would be large, implying more processing time for LF SR. The peaks in the chart for some graphs, such as for ibm08 with 51309 vertices, indicate that the maximum degrees of these graphs are very large, resulting more number of terms in g(x).
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose an Internet-based scheme that ensures both direct and indirect IP protection. To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the very few IP protection schemes encompassing both cryptography and watermarking. The novelty of the work is that it is Internet-based, and uses LF SR perhaps for the first time in IP protection. The proposed method has scopes of improvement in terms of (i) embedding the watermark within the input graph, (ii) using public-private key combinations.
